In this article, we compare the distribution of price changes between collusive and non-collusive periods for 11 major cartels. Based on the theoretical and empirical results from previous research, we discuss the four moments with respect to price changes (mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis). However, none of the above descriptive statistics can be considered as a robust test allowing a differentiation between competition and cartel. Therefore, we implement the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. According to our results, 9 of 11 cartels were successful in controlling the market price for a number of years. The proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and regulatory purposes.
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this article is to develop an empirical method that consistently measures changes in price variation caused by cartel conduct, which can be used by antitrust authorities to screen alleged illegal collusion. The approach can also be useful as an additional technique for establishing damages in antitrust legal proceedings concerning price fixing agreements.
Previous studies have found many different characteristics for identifying collusive behavior. For example, Bajari and Ye (2003) or Porter and Zona (1993) concentrate on some selected bidding markets and demonstrate the difference between collusive and competitive bidding behavior. Recent studies analyze price dispersion to detect collusive behavior; see Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) , Geist (2009, 2011) and Bolotova et al. (2008) . These studies focus, with different methods, only on the first two moments of price variation (mean and variance). We show that this is inadequate as a means of detecting cartel activity in markets in general, because mean and price variation could be affected, for example, by price trends. To make it clearer, if we do not observe, for example, a substantial increase in prices during the observation period, it does not necessarily mean that there is no cartel. The cartel could have been established during a phase of price reduction as well. Previous methods would fail to detect such cases.
In this article, we develop appropriate empirical methods and provide evidence on different cartel cases. Therefore, we first assume that cartels need negotiation time to change prices. This holds for the formation phase and for reactions to exogenous shocks. 1 Second, established cartels are more likely to react with price raises, in contrast to price reductions, even if they fail their steady-state level. To analyze these hypotheses, we add kurtosis and skewness to the first moments. 2 We expect leptokurtic price change distributions around zero, because of delays in price changes during the cartel phase (and therefore more 'near-zero changes', in contrast to a competitive benchmark). If the distribution of price changes is leptokurtic and positive price changes occur relatively more often than negative ones, we expect a positive skewness for the cartel phase. In addition, we employ the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which is a nonparametric (distribution-free) test comparing two distributions. In fact, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D-statistic measures a distance between the empirical distribution functions of two samples.
Hence, antitrust authorities may be able to detect cartels, because of specifics in price change distribution. Adding to previous studies, we analyze numerous cartel cases, which yields new evidence of cartel behavior. Our analysis focuses on major price cartels in Germany and the relevant organizations were recently prosecuted by the European Commission.
The article is structured as follows. First, we discuss the theoretical background and hypotheses. Second, we present the data we used for our analysis. Third, the empirical results are presented. The final section concludes.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Price dispersion has been the focus of both regulatory and academic efforts to identify collusive behavior. 3 Collusion leads to multiple changes in industry structure and behavior that are expected to affect price dispersion. First of allif we assume that a cartel operates as a multiplant monopolistthere is an increase in market concentration. Stigler (1964) states that price dispersion is ubiquitous, even for homogenous products. It takes place when different suppliers offer different prices for the same good on a certain market. Several studies, including those by Carlson and McAfee (1983) and Carlton (1986) , demonstrate that price dispersion is greater when industry concentration declines. Furthermore, according to Connor (2005) , cartels usually fix prices either by announcing list prices to buyers and agreeing to sell only at this price or by agreeing to sell at some lower 'floor' (minimum) price or at a 'target' (average) price below 1. For the description of cartel behaviour during the formation-phase see Blanckenburg and Geist (2009) . 2. For the empirical implementation of skewness and kurtosis considering collusive prices, see Connor (2004) . 3. For a good overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on collusion and price dispersion, see Harrington (2005) .
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list. Some cartels also agree to eliminate or restrict discounts, which reduces the variance of prices. There is some empirical support for this hypothesis. Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) examine the effects of a bid-rigging cartel in frozen perch sold to the U.S. Department of Defence. As a result, they find a relatively small difference in price, but a huge difference in variance, when comparing the collusive and competitive regimes. The average price dropped by 23% after the conspiracy was detected, but even more significant, the variance of price increased by 145%, compared with the variance during the cartel period. For the lysine cartel, Bolotova et al. (2008) find support for the hypotheses that the mean increases and the variance decreases in the cartel period relative to the competitive regimes. Citric acid prices in this study confirm the mean price hypothesis, but fail to support the variance hypothesis. The variance was even higher as compared with the pre-and post-cartel periods. Blanckenburg and Geist (2009) find a significant lower variance in price changes for the cartel period of the German cement industry 1981-2001, compared with the pre-and post-cartel periods. However, looking at the first two moments might not be sufficient. If there is a trend in prices, for example, because of continuously increasing oil prices, the comparison of means and price variances could be biased by the length of the cartel period and the length of the competitive one. To identify the difference in price-setting behaviorif possible, independently of market characteristicsit is important to compare the entire distribution of price changes.
Therefore, we extend the discussion to the third (skewness) and fourth moments (kurtosis), which were firstly analyzed by Connor (2004) . We assume that cartels change their prices less often, compared with a competitive benchmark. That is because of slow decision processes within a cartel and a certain slackness of cartels regarding adjustments to demand and supply shocks. Price changes have to be negotiated by cartel members, which extends the time of adaptation. Hence, H1: the distribution of price changes under a cartel has a higher peak around zero.
This hypothesis is supported empirically by Connor (2004) . He analyzed an alleged US cartel in the late 1980s and early 1990s, finding an increase in leptokurtosis.
Furthermore, for the cartel period, it is plausible to assume that price changes are positively correlated with positive demand shocks. Positive demand shocks increase the profit maximizing price and the profit maximizing quantity, and therefore, the cartel members have an incentive to adjust their agreement, which leads to a positive correlation. The adjustments to negative demand shocks are more difficult, because if cartel members cannot reliably observe the quantities of other members, they are not able to differentiate between demand fluctuations and cheating. Therefore, price decreases after a negative demand shock could be misunderstood by other cartel members as cheating, and may cause price wars (Green and Porter, 1984) . 4 Accordingly, we should observe some kind of 'ratchet effect' and hence more positive than negative price changes. However, the economic literature does not provide a clear prediction on this issue. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) argue, assuming i.i.d. pattern of demand fluctuation, that collusion is most difficult to achieve in booms, when the incentive to cheat is greatest, and predict price changes that are countercyclical. Haltinwanger and Harrington (1991) relax the i.i.d. assumption by assuming instead that the level of demand follows a deterministic cycle and find that collusive prices are often procyclical. The empirical evidence is mixed and inconclusive. 5 In our framework, the existence of a 'ratchet effect' can be tested by the skewness of the distribution of price changes. If cartels prefer price increases and zero changes instead of price reductions (see H1), we should then observe a higher positively skewed distribution of price changes, compared with competitive regimes. Hence, H2: The distribution of price changes under a cartel has a higher positive (or less negative) skewness. 6
Both hypotheses, the expected prices and price changes during cartel and competition are illustrated in Figure 1 .
DATA DESCRIPTION
This study uses monthly price indices from the German Federal Statistical Office (GFSO) of selected industries from 1976 to 2009. We use the nominal price indices to observe the real cartel behavior (e.g., lagged price adjustments). It is to consider that, if the phases of high inflation rates are not equally shared between competitive and collusive periods, the results of skewness analysis might be biased. The price indices are calculated by the GFSO using salesweighted prices of industry members. All used cartel industries are classified by the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community [Nomenclature Générale des Activités É conomiques (NACE)]. This classification is designed to categorize data. 7 The presented cases were prosecuted by the European antitrust authority. 8 We focus on major cartels containing German market segments. Table 1a lists the analyzed product markets by data. We show the NACE code of these products and in brackets the NACE code of used price data. As is evident, exact data are not available for all cases (i.e. hydrogen peroxide and perborate; monochloroacetic acid). We indicate the period in which price data are available and point out the cartel phase. As cartel prosecution typically leads immediately to substantial price reductions, we have excluded the first six months after cartel detection from the empirical analysis. 5. The empirical literature includes, for example, the industry studies of Borenstein and Shephard (1996) and Porter (1983) . 6. This hypothesis is supported by Connor (2004 Furthermore, we compared only cartel and post-cartel phases, to ensure that we have meaningful phases. 9 Finally, we show, in Table 1b , the companies involved and the total fines imposed by the European Commission.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To detect whether cartel pricing is different from the competition pricing let us first observe the distribution of price changes under competition (continuous black line) compared with the distribution of price changes under cartel (dotted gray line)see Figure 2 . The empirical density functions were obtained using the Gaussian kernel. The smoothing bandwidth for this kernel is computed using the following rule-of-thumb: 9. The European Commission covers its judgments with regard to the cartel start only to the time for with absolute security already a cartel was given. Price agreements could actually be existent before.
BW ¼ 0:9 minðr; IQRÞ 1:34N À1=5 ;
where r is the standard deviation, IQR is the interquartile range and N is the sample size. All computations are made using the programming language R. One can immediately see that under cartel the price changes are much less volatile and very densely concentrated around the mean. This impression becomes even stronger when one examines the descriptive statistics of the price changes under competition and cartel. Our analysis includes the first four moments of the corresponding distributions: mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis. The results will be summarized in the following. 10 First, the means of most products both under competition and under cartel appear to be statistically indistinguishable from zero. Under competition, there are only three products, for which the null hypothesis of mean equal to 0 can be rejected: hydrogen peroxide and perborate and monochloroacetic acid and Second, the variances of price changes under cartels seem to be substantially lower than that under competition. This applies to all the products apart from coffee. These differences in volatility are significant in all cases, but three: monochloroacetic acid, plasterboard and synthetic rubbers.
Third, under competition, the distribution of prices changes of four products is skewed: two negatively (plastic industrial bags and synthetic rubbers) and two positively (coffee and vitamins). Under cartel, the distributions of eight products out of eleven are skewed: seven positively and only one negatively. Negative skewness implies that the negative price changes occur relatively more often than the positive price changes. These observations are in accordance with what one would have expected, as the cartels are much less inclined to price decreases than the competitive firms.
Fourth, under competition, the distributions of nine products out of eleven are leptokurtic implying that they have more acute peaks. The only products, whose distributions have zero excess kurtosis are marine hose and coffee. Under cartel, only eight distributions out of eleven are leptokurtic. The three exceptions are: hydrogen peroxide and perborate, monochloroacetic acid and plastic industrial bags. In addition, in all cases, save three (gas-insulated switchgear, marine hose and synthetic rubbers), the distributions of price changes under competition are more acutely peaked than those under cartel. This appears to be at odds with what we saw in Figure 2 . However, this can be explained by the fact that the distributions depicted in these two figures are not standardized (i.e., not divided by the standard deviations) and the price changes under cartel, as we saw before, are significantly less volatile than under competition.
Hence, none of the aforesaid descriptive statistics, with an exception perhaps of variance, can be considered as a robust test allowing distinguishing between competition and cartel. Such a test must be in a position to capture the anomalous difference between the competition and cartel distributions that we saw in Figure 2 .
Therefore, we decided to employ the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which is a non-parametric (distribution-free) test comparing two distributions. In fact, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D-statistic measures a distance between the empirical distribution functions of two samples. The null hypothesis of two samples states that both samples are drawn from the same distribution. Formally, the test statistic is defined as follows:
where F 0 (x) and F 1 (x) are the empirical cumulative distribution functions constructed for each of the two samples being compared. In words, the empirical cumulative distribution functions are compared (as absolute differences of function values) in each point of distribution support and then the largest absolute difference is taken as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic. When this supremum absolute difference exceeds certain critical value, the null of two samples being drawn from the same distribution is rejected.
The results of the bootstrap version of the traditional Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the 'raw' and demeaned data are as follows: in the former case, the null hypothesis is rejected for all the products except coffee. However, when applied to the demeaned data the test fails to reject the null in two products: hydrogen peroxide and perborate and monochloroacetic acid. Recall that these two products were the only ones, for which data are available only on a higher aggregate NACE level (see Table 1a ). Obviously, the results are biased because of the data mismatch. Therefore, we can conclude that the distributions of price changes under the competition and under the cartel do differ. These differences can be detected using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
CONCLUSION
Our article implements the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to examine the differences in behavior during collusive and non-collusive periods. We use prices from 11 recently discovered conspiracies. The empirical results confirm that 9 out of 11 cartels were successful in controlling the market price for a number of years (for two cartels, no representative data are available).
Following Harrington (2005) , we argue that negotiations lead to delays in price changes. We confirm this hypothesis empirically and show that the distribution of price changes under a cartel has a higher peak around zero (H1). The results confirm that none of the descriptive statistics, with the possible exception of variance, can be considered as a robust test, which differentiates between competition and cartel. Especially for markets with price trends, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is required to detect different price change behaviors. Hence, we are able, in contrast to previous studies (e.g. Bolotova et al., 2008) , to implement different market structures in the cartel detection analysis. Furthermore, we find some evidence to support the hypothesis that the distribution of price changes under a cartel is positively skewed (H2). In comparison with the competition phases, 8 out of 11 distributions of price changes under a cartel are positively skewed. However, the results should be confirmed by further empirical analysis.
An important direction of further research would be to examine the applicability of proposed screens for collusion. This article shows how markets with different structures could easily be analyzed in a general screening. Our study von Blanckenburg et al.
focuses on price cartels, so that it would be both interesting and useful to apply the proposed methodology to other forms of tacit collusion. In addition, it is necessary to develop methods for generating the initial suspicion of a collusive period. If so, the presented test can be used to substantiate such suspicion.
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